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Constitutional Protection For Conversations
Between Therapists and Clients
Paul E. Salamanca*
And Saul, yet breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the
disciples of the Lord, went unto the high priest, and desired of him
letters to Damascus to the synagogues, that if he found any of this
way, whether they were men or women, he might bring them bound
unto Jerusalem. And as he journeyed, he came near Damascus: and
suddenly there shined round about him a light from heaven: And he
fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why
persecutest thou me?'
And Saul arose from the earth; and when his eyes were opened,
he saw no man: but they led him by the hand, and brought him into
Damascus.2
Three of young [Martin] Luther's contemporaries... report that
sometime during his early or middle twenties, he suddenly fell to the
ground in the choir of the monastery at Erfurt, "raved" like one
possessed, and roared with the voice of a bull: "Ich bin's nit! Ich
bin's nit!" or "Non sum! Non sum'
3
I. INTRODUCTION
People have long perceived a connection between mental and even physical
illness and spiritual anguish. Yet, modem culture tends to view both types of
illness from an increasingly medical perspective, seeking a genetic or
environmental explanation. In most cases, this "medical model" is probably the
best approach, even if it is imperfect. First, the purely medical explanation may
be accurate. Second, even if it is not accurate, treating the symptoms of a
disease with a spiritual source is probably far easier than treating the source
itself. Ultimately, however, we must take note that disease is often not the result
of genetics or "environment" in the scientific sense. Otherwise, we will lose our
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. I would like
to thank Richard Ausness, Michael Cox, Mike Healy, Jennifer Philpot, John Rogers and
Peter Spiro for reading and commenting on drafts of this Article.
1. Acts 9:1-4 (King James).
2. Acts 9:8 (King James) (emphasis removed).
3. ERIK H. ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER: A STUDY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
HISTORY 23 (1958) (footnotes omitted). Erikson adds that the German words are best
translated as "'It isn't me!' (leaving the King's English aside) and the Latin as 'I am
not!"" Id.
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ability to adapt psychologically to new ways of life. Often, it is the individual
suffering psychological anguish who accurately perceives the crises that will
beset the culture as a whole a generation or more later. If the culture is to
prepare for these crises, we must not categorically dismiss the psychological
anguish of the individual as mere genetic or environmental defect. That person
may be doing us a favor.4
One powerful example of the widespread acceptance of the medical model
is the emergence of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")5 as a means
of limiting questions by public licensing authorities about mental illness. Before
Congress enacted the ADA, authorities routinely asked applicants for licenses
to disclose extensive information about mental illness, including such courses
of treatment as counseling and hospitalization.6 Since then, courts, advocates,
and public officials have construed the ADA to prohibit or limit many of these
questions. Although authorities continue to ask intrusive questions in many
jurisdictions, the ADA has had an enormous salutary impact for people who
have sought and obtained psychological treatment. Given this progress,
advocates might understandably feel justified in challenging only those
authorities who continue to ask intrusive questions and in not bothering to ask
whether the end of excluding such questions from applications justifies the
means presented by the ADA. But if the medical model upon which the ADA
is based is flawed, as I suggest it might be, we should ask precisely that question.
Moreover, if the medical model is a poor or incomplete justification for limiting
these kinds of questions, we might also profitably ask whether there are other
4. As the prominent psychologist Erich Neumann notes:
It is not difficult to understand why positive attempts at a solution appear
earlier and are more easily recognisable in the development of the individual
than in that of the collective. The individual who is brought up against the
overwhelming problem of evil and is shaken by it, and often driven by it right
up to the brink of the abyss, naturally defends himself against destruction. In
order to survive at all, he needs, not as a matter of arbitrary choice but of
urgent necessity, the aid of forces of the deep unconscious; in them and in
himself he may be able to find new ways, new forms of life, new values and
new guiding symbols.
ERICH NEUMANN, DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND A NEW ETHIc 29 (Eugene Rolfe trans., 1969).
This is not to say, however, that people suffering from mental illness or subject to unique
pressures invariably present positive options for the culture. In fact, they may seriously
endanger the culture. This is particularly true where such people obtain political power.
See generally VOLODYMR WALTER ODAJNYK, JUNG AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL IDEAS OF C.G. JUNG 22 (1976). Odajnyk writes: "In the realm of politics, the
political leader who has inflated his personality through identification with his office, or
who feels that he represents the collective will experiences a sense of self-confidence,
omnipotence, and megalomania that borders on 'godlikeness."' Id.
5.42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12180 (1994).
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justifications available for such limitations. In fact, such justifications are at
least implicit in the federal Constitution's guarantees of due process,7 free
exercise of religion,' and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.9 The
Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clauses protect people from
arbitrary intrusion into certain intensely private aspects of their lives.'"
Arguably, conversations between a patient and a therapist designed to alleviate
mental illness should qualify for the protection of these clauses." The First
Amendment explicitly prohibits interference with the free exercise of religion.
To the extent therapy replicates or facilitates traditional confessional
relationships, it should qualify for some level of protection under this clause. 2
Finally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures,
providing further support for the argument that intrusive questions violate the
Constitution.'
3
Admittedly, it is unrealistic to think that much litigation will occur in this
area in the short term, given the wide impact of the ADA, and given the
7. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No person shall.., be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "[N]or shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV., § 1.
8. The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has held that the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment apply to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (Establishment Clause); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause).
9. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment applies
to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
10. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing
a right of married persons to use contraceptive devices); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465-67 (1958) (recognizing a right, in certain contexts, for an
association to keep confidential the names of its members). See infra notes 131-61 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of these cases.
11. I use the word "therapist" as a generic term for a professional trained to treat the
mentally ill. The focus of this Article is on therapists who treat their patients at least in
part by engaging them in conversation.
12. See infra notes 162-97 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 198-234 and accompanying text.
1999]
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Supreme Court's current reluctance to recognize new constitutional rights. 4
Nevertheless, and if only for hortatory reasons, we should criticize the ADA for
its questionable premises and note that the Constitution might better protect the
relationship between therapist and patient from unnecessary official scrutiny.
Moreover, if licensing officials voluntarily limit questions about treatment for
mental illness in light of constitutional principles, a precedent might be set for
the long term. If, as jurists and commentators suggest, the Constitution comes
to protect those rights widely valued in the culture, habitual non-judicial respect
for the privacy of the therapeutic process will ultimately provide raw material
for a judicial extension of constitutional protection to this process. 5
In Part II of this Article, I will describe the dilemma licensing authorities
pose for applicants by asking intrusive questions about treatment for mental
illness.' 6 In Part III, I will set forth the relevant provisions of the ADA 7 and
discuss some of the more prominent cases 8 arising under the Act. In Part IV,
I will discuss some weaknesses of the medical model upon which Congress has
based the ADA. 9 Specifically, I will argue that the medical model potentially
distorts experiences that may have religious importance and encourages
trivialization of individual and religious growth. In Part V, I will discuss
alternative, constitutional bases for protecting conversations between patients
and therapists.2  Finally, in Part VI, I will argue that, in light of judicial
reluctance to recognize new areas of constitutional protection, non-judicial
members of the government should voluntarily treat the interests I identify as
having a constitutional dimension.2'
14. Two terms ago, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Constitution does
not protect the right of a terminally ill patient to obtain the assistance of a physician in
committing suicide. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 (1997). In
the course of reaching this decision, the Court noted:
[W]e "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended." By extending constitutional protection to an
asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside
the arena of public debate and legislative action.
Id. at 2267-68 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
15. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 59-89 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 98-122 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 123-234 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 235-44 and accompanying text. An additional justification for
noting possible constitutional limitations on the power of licensing officials to ask
intrusive questions about treatment for mental illness lies in helping courts to identify the
proper reach of the ADA. Over time, the Constitution and the ADA may come to be
interpreted in pari materia.
[Vol. 64
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II. THE DILEMMA POSED BY INTRUSIVE QUESTIONS
Many licensing authorities, such as those charged with controlling
admission to the bar or to the practice of medicine, routinely inquire about
applicants' history of mental illness. To some extent this is understandable,
given such authorities' obligation to protect the public from unqualified
22practitioners. 2 An example are the following two questions, which the New
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners once asked as part of its initial and renewal
licensing processes:
1. Have you ever been treated for alcohol or drug abuse?
2. Have you ever suffered from or been treated for any mental
illness or psychiatric problems?'
Despite the ADA, such questions are common on applications to the bar and on
forms used by other government agencies. There is also often a follow-up
procedure as well, which can involve submission of records.24
Many applicants are understandably reluctant to answer these questions
truthfully. Their reasons are both professional and personal. As a professional
matter, they may fear that authorities will deny them a license or admission to
the bar, or make their professional status contingent upon the performance of
22. See Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1994);
In re Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741,741 (Minn. 1994). See generally Kelly R. Becton, Note,
Attorneys: The Americans with Disabilities Act Should Not Impair the Regulation of the
Legal Profession Where Mental Health Is an Issue, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 353, 355 (1996)
("The threat of attorney misconduct caused by mental illness is real. Bar examiners and
courts must have the capacity to protect the public from such harm."). Becton argues that
narrowly tailored questions concerning an applicant's current ability to practice law "are
necessary to protect potential clients from incapable attorneys. Medical data provides
that certain serious mental illnesses can reoccur over periods extending up to ten years.
This information shows that treatment information concerning these chronic illnesses may
very well serve to alert bar examiners of current and potential incapacity." Id. at 383-84.
23. See Medical Soc'y v. Jacobs, No. Civ. A. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016,
at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993). According to the court in Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar
Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 440 (E.D. Va. 1995), bar examiners in 18 jurisdictions
were asking unlimited questions about mental illness in 1995. In Kentucky, for example,
the examiners asked: "Have you ever been diagnosed or received regular treatment for
amnesia, emotional disturbance, nervous or mental disorder?" Id. at 440 n.19.
24. See, e.g., Jacobs, 1993 WL 41306, at *2 (noting that the Board required
applicants to "explain [affirmative answers] on a separate sheet, including dates of all
incidents"); id. at *7 (noting that "those who provide[d] affirmative answers to the
challenged questions [were] subject to further investigation"). See also In re Applications
of Underwood & Plano for Admission to the Bar, 1993 WL 649283, at *1 n.2 (Me. Dec.
7, 1993) (setting forth the text of release). See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Moral
Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 581, 582 (1985).
1999]
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some undertaking." As a personal matter, they may resist revealing
embarrassing facts to strangers, or worse, to people with whom they expect to
work.26 Such resistance can arise from embarrassment about events of the past
or it can arise from fear of releasing information about an ongoing course of
treatment.
None of this should be particularly surprising. The community of mental
health professionals has long recognized the role of confidentiality in effective
treatment.27 It is natural to think that exposing a private, subjective process to
objective, external scrutiny might impair or calcify its progress. As the
psychologist Walter Odajnyk has written:
All basic changes in the individual are the culmination of a
natural process that begins with the personal encounter between man
and man, and between the individual and his God. Jung insists that
the only effective counterbalance to mass-mindedness, to the
deindividualizing influence of the collective, and to the demoralizing
effects of the dictatorial state is an individual inner transcendent
experience. Only on the basis of such an experience can the
individual resist the moral blandishments of the world and protect
himself from an otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass. 28
In a similar vein, the legal community has long noted, in widely varying
contexts, the importance of confidentiality in intimate advisory or confessional
relationships. Examples include the evidentiary privileges that protect the
relationships between attorney and client, husband and wife, and clergy and
penitent, to name three. In fact, the Supreme Court has used its discretion under
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to recognize a privilege for
conversations between psychologists and patients in federal court, noting that
"[e]ffective psychotherapy... depends upon an atmosphere of trust in which the
patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears. 29 Indeed, many jurisdictions recognize a privilege for
25. See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 435 (noting the practice in some states of granting
licenses to practice law upon the condition that applicants continue counseling or
treatment for mental illness).
26. The problem can be particularly acute in states with a small, relatively cohesive
bar. Although character committees may be well known for their probity, the chances are
high in such states that applicants will practice with or before some of its members for
a lifetime.
27. See generally Rhode, supra note 24, at 582-83.
28. ODAJNYK, supra note 5, at 60. If in fact individual psychological growth occurs
in tension with the demands of the culture, it follows that there must be separation
between the two.
29. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996). Rule 501 provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
[Vol. 64
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conversations between physicians and patients or between therapists and
patients.3°
In another vein, many officials in the federal government enjoy privileges
arising from the nature of their office. The Constitution itself supplies a
legislative privilege for members of the House and Senate. This privilege,
articulated in the Speech or Debate Clause,31 protects members of Congress from
liability arising from statements made in connection with the legislative
process. 32 Although this clause typically protects statements made in full view
of the public, in theory it would also shield members from inquiry into
confidential communications.33 More to the point of privacy, the Supreme Court
recognized an executive privilege in dictum in United States v. Nixon.34 In that
case, the Court reviewed a claim by President Nixon that he should not have to
comply with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to produce certain
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
30. See generally Steven R. Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and
Confidentiality: On Giving with One Hand and Removing with the Other, 75 KY. L.J.
473, 475 (1987) (noting that, although legislation in most states confers such protection,
exceptions accumulate and swallow the rule). The Supreme Court has also suggested that
a law that unduly interferes with the relationship between physician and patient might
violate the First Amendment. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) ("It could
be argued... that traditional relationships such as that between doctor and patient should
enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation, even when
subsidized by the Government."); cf Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1975)
(per curiam) (upholding a prohibition against the performance of abortions by non-
physicians). The Court said in Menillo: "Roe teaches that a State cannot restrict a
decision by a woman, with the advice of herphysician, to terminate her pregnancy during
the first trimester." Id. (emphasis added).
31. This Clause provides: "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, §
6, cl. 1.
32. Obviously, many of these conversations are public, and the Constitution only
protects them in the sense that members of Congress need fear no exposure in court for
their words. Nevertheless, the principle remains that the Constitution protects "the
deliberative and communicative processes" by which Congress operates. Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
33. Because the Speech or Debate Clause protects members of Congress and their
aides from liability arising from what they say or to some extent do in connection with
the legislative process, the clause in fact confers both immunity and a privilege. See
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.9, at 259 (5th ed.
1995).
34. 418 U.S. 683, 705-06, 708 (1974).
1999]
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recordings of conversations that had occurred in the Oval Office. Nixon argued
that release of the recordings would compromise the President's ability to gather
truthful yet sensitive information. 35 Although the Court ruled against the
President,36 it did not reject out of hand his argument that some privilege
attaches to the office of the President. In fact, it described the need for
protecting "communications between high Government officials and those who
advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties" as "too plain
to require further discussion. ' 37 The Court went on, however, to hold that an
across-the-board claim of executive privilege, such as the claim Nixon had
asserted, had to give way to a specific, demonstrated need in an ongoing
criminal prosecution.3 The Court's reasoning in that case is instructive:
"Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their
remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their
own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process."39 Given our
recognition of evidentiary and political privileges in such a wide variety of
contexts, we should not be surprised that people are reluctant to answer
questions about treatment for mental illness on applications for licenses.
Notwithstanding the usefulness of withholding information about treatment
for mental illness, however, such a route is not easy to take. First, one hopes that
few people aspiring to be lawyers or members of another profession are
comfortable disobeying the law.49 Moreover, as a practical matter, an applicant
exposes him or herself to significant liability by lying in response to questions
like those posed by New Jersey's medical examiners. 4' Lying in a material way
to the federal government, for instance, is a violation of federal law and can
carry a fine of up to ten thousand dollars and up to five years' imprisonment.42
35. Id. at 705.
36. Id. at 713-14.
37. Id. at 705.
38. Id. at 713.
39. Id. at 705.
40. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that many people do lie on such
applications. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430,437 (E.D. Va.
1995) (noting the wide discrepancy between the number of people suffering from "some
form of mental or emotional disorder at any given time" and the number of people
admitting to having obtained treatment for such disorders in response to a question posed
by bar examiners).
41. See supra text accompanying note 23.
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). This Section provides in relevant part as follows:
[WIhoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative,
or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully: (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme or device
a material fact; (2) or makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation.., shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). The Supreme Court has recently held that Section 1001 means
[Vol. 64
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Moreover, lying on an application for a license or a job can lead to revocation
of the license or loss of the position.' Accordingly, people for whom a factually
correct answer to these questions is "yes" must choose between telling the truth
and taking their chances (which may be the best thing to do in most
circumstances), 44 lying and taking their chances (which many do),45 or
challenging officials' authority to ask intrusive questions at all. Armed with the
ADA, many have recently, and successfully, chosen the last course of action.
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The ADA essentially establishes "disability" as a suspect classification and
warrants heightened judicial review of any law that tends to sort people out on
the basis of disability.46 Several plaintiffs or groups of plaintiffs have challenged
intrusive questions about mental illness under this Act. Noting that mental
illness, addiction to drugs, and alcoholism can all be disabilities within the
meaning of the ADA,47 they have argued that at least some questions about
treatment unlawfully discriminate against them because of their disabilities.
These arguments have met with considerable success through litigation and the
threat of litigation.
exactly what it says. See Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 811-12 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Medical Soc'y v. Jacobs, No. Civ. A. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL
413016, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993).
44. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
45. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 437 (E.D. Va.
1995).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). This paragraph provides in part:
"[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced
with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society." 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(7) (1994). Historically, the judiciary, not Congress, decided which groups
qualified for heightened protection under the Constitution. In fact, the language quoted
above tracks the language of the famous footnote four of the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Such
legislation as the ADA reflects Congress' increasing assumption of this role.
Although the Court did not explicitly refer to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in footnote four of Carolene Products, laws and policies that
distinguish between people without sufficient justification-or that, in some cases, fail
to take into account important difference-implicate the Equal Protection Clause. That
Clause provides: "[jN]or shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1998).
1999]
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A. The ADA and Its Implementing Regulations
Congress enacted the ADA for the purpose of "providing a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities. '48 Title II of the ADA49 governs entities in the
public sector.50 Section 202 generally prohibits the discriminatory denial of
public benefits to a "qualified individual with a disability."5' Regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General to implement Title II in turn prohibit
public entities from using discriminatory criteria or methods of discrimination, 2
from discriminating in connection with a license or certification, 3 and from
setting criteria that have the effect of screening out qualified disabled individuals
from the full and equal enjoyment of public programs. 4 These regulations
further provide that a "physical or mental impairment" includes a broad range
of diseases and conditions, including addiction to drugs or alcoholism.55 For
48.42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150 (1994).
50. The ADA explicitly applies to instrumentalities of the states. See 42 U.S.C. §
12131(l)(A), (B) (1994). Although the Act does not explicitly include licensing
authorities within the definition of a public entity, implementing regulations promulgated
by the Department of Justice do. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (1998).
51.42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). The Act defines a "disability" as "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994). Title II of the Act defines "qualified
individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994).
52. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i) (1998) provides as follows: "(3) A public entity
may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods
of administration: (i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with
disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability."
53. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (1998) provides in pertinent part as follows:
A public entity may not administer a licensing or certification program in a
manner that subjects qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination
on the basis of disability, nor may a public entity establish requirements for
the programs or activities of licensees or certified entities that subject
qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of
disability.
54. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1998) provides as follows:
A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or
tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals
with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or
activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision
of the service, program, or activity being offered.
55.28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1998). See generally Medical Soc'y v. Jacobs, No. Civ. A.
[Vol. 64
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purposes of this Article, the gravamen of the ADA appears to be that licensing
authorities may not impose an unnecessary burden, such as denial of a license
or an obligation to release medical records, upon a qualified individual with a
disability. 6 On the other hand, a person with a disability is not "qualified" under
the Act if he or she "poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others."57 But
the implementing regulations are quick to add that:
The determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health
or safety of others may not be based on generalizations or stereotypes
about the effects of a particular disability. It must be based on an
individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies
on current medical evidence or on the best available objective
evidence, to determine: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk;
the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and
whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures
will mitigate the risk.-8
The ADA thus authorizes courts to evaluate, ad hoc, the pros and cons of
subjecting people who have received treatment for mental illness to additional
burdens in connection with public licensing procedures. The Act presents an
impressive array of weapons to challenge intrusive questions about mental
health.
B. Litigation Under the ADA
Armed with this battery of statutes and regulations, many people have
succeeded in getting licensing officials to change or limit the scope of intrusive
questions about mental illness. By late 1997, cases had been decided in
numerous jurisdictions, including Florida, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Texas, 59 and administrative resolutions had been
93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993).
56. See Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *7.
57. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 444 (1998). This appendix defines a "direct threat"
as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or
services." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 444 (1998).
58. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 444 (1998). The appendix attributes this test to the
Supreme Court's decision in Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), in which, say
the regulations, the Court "recognized... a need to balance the interests of people with
disabilities against legitimate concerns for public safety." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 444
(1998).
59. See Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, 906
F. Supp. 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (regarding nominations for the bench); Clark v. Virginia
Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995) (regarding admission to the bar);
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reached in many jurisdictions. In all but one of the reported decisions,60 the
courts ruled or at least indicated that questions had to be modified or eliminated.
The trend seems to be toward limiting authorities to questions about relatively
recent and decidedly serious mental illness. Although the courts interpreting and
applying the ADA have differed somewhat in their approaches, the opinions
follow roughly similar patterns, and I will discuss only three representative
cases.
1. Medical Society v. Jacobs
One of the first reported decisions involving licensing procedures and the
ADA, although it resolved only an application for a preliminary injunction, was
Medical Society v. Jacobs.6' At issue in Jacobs were several questions about
mental illness that the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners put to
applicants for initial or renewal licenses. The Board asked applicants for initial
licenses, among other things, the following questions:
1. Have you ever been treated for alcohol or drug abuse?
2. Have you ever suffered from or been treated for any mental
illness or psychiatric problems? 62
If an applicant answered either of these questions in the affirmative, he or she
was required to have any "treating physicians ... submit directly to the Board
Office, a summary of the [relevant] diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis."'63
Applicants v. Texas State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A 93 CA 740 SS, 1994 WL 923404
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994) (regarding admission to the bar); Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (regarding admission to the bar); In re
Underwood, 1993 WL 649283 (Me. Dec. 7, 1993) (regarding admission to the bar);
Medical Soc'y v. Jacobs, No. Civ. A. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,
1993) (regarding medical licensing); In re Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1994)
(regarding admission to the bar); In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the
Rhode Island Bar, 683 A.2d 1333 (RI. 1996) (regarding admission to the bar).
60. In Applicants v. Texas State Board of Law Examiners, the court upheld
questions that had been redrawn in anticipation of challenge under the Act. Texas
Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *1. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this case.
61. No. Civ. A. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993).
62. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs in the case also challenged a question relating to
dependence on alcohol or "Controlled Dangerous Substances" and another question
relating to physical disabilities. Id.
63. Id. at *1-2. The Board put similar questions to applicants for renewal licenses,
although applicants answering "yes" to such questions were only required to explain their
answers "in detail on a separate sheet, including dates of all incidents." Id. at *2.
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In an opinion that gave little weight to information that the state might
obtain only by asking these types of questions, 64 the court held that the plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge. The court reasoned that
the "vast majority" of applicants who would answer the challenged questions in
the affirmative were "nevertheless qualified" to hold a medical license "by
reason of [their] character, training, and experience., 65 Because the Board
subjected these applicants to further investigation, and because the Board could
ask non-intrusive questions relating solely to conduct and performance on the
job, the court concluded that the questions probably violated the ADA.66 The
court went on to refuse the preliminary injunction, however, on the grounds that
the plaintiffs had not shown danger of immediate and irreparable harm.67 The
litigants ultimately settled the lawsuit when the licensing authority agreed to
limit the questions asked.68
2. Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners
In a later case in Virginia, a court used the ADA to strike down a similar
question. Julie Ann Clark suffered from a condition diagnosed as "major
depression, recurrent., 69 When applying for admission to the Virginia Bar, she
64. Licensing authorities have argued that, because these types of questions seek
objectively verifiable information, applicants have less discretion to decide on their own
how much information to disclose. See infra note 66 for further discussion of this point.
65. Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *6.
66. Id. at *6-7. The court suggested that inquiry into applicants' unreliability,
neglect of work or failure to live up to responsibilities were valid inquiries into past
behavior, but that inquiries concerning the mental health per se of applicants was not
permissible. Id. at *7. The court also noted that the Board could obtain information
from such other sources as patients' complaints and references. Id.
Although it is outside the scope of this Article, one weakness in the court's
consolatory advice to the Board is that a licensing authority would arguably have great,
if not insuperable, difficulty in proving that an applicant lied about his or her "failure to
live up to responsibilities," given the malleable character of that phrase. Whether the
applicant obtained treatment for a mental illness is objectively verifiable-the applicant's
insurer, for one, would probably know-and therefore not something about which an
applicant could safely lie. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430,
436 (E.D. Va. 1995) (relating the testimony of Dr. Charles B. Mutter). According to the
court in Clark, Dr. Mutter testified: "Broad mental health questions are essential for
collecting complete information regarding applicants' fitness to practice law. Narrower
mental health questions.., are inadequate because they allow applicants to filter their
responses and provide self-promoting answers." Id.
67. Applicants v. Texas State Bd. of Law Examiners, No. A 93 CA 740 SS, 1994
WL 923404, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994).
68. Maureen Castellano, Increase in Licensing Fees for Doctors Is Called
Retaliation, N.J. L.J., Aug. 28, 1995, at 8.
69. Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 432.
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refused to answer Question 20(b) of the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners'
questionnaire relating to character and fitness.7" This question asked whether
she had received any treatment or counseling for a mental, emotional, or nervous
disorder within the previous five years.7 ' She also refused to comply with
Question 21, which called for an explanation of an affirmative answer to
Question 20(b).72 Such an explanation would have included specific information
about treatment and counseling, including names of attending physicians,
counselors, and health care providers and descriptions of diagnosis, treatment,
prognosis, and "other relevant facts." 73 The Board indicated that it would not
grant Clark a license to practice unless she completed the questionnaire. 74
In an opinion considerably more elaborate and nuanced than that rendered
in Jacobs, the court concluded that Question 20(b) was too broad to survive
challenge under the ADA and ordered the Board to eliminate it from the
application. 75 Specifically, the court credited the testimony of Dr. Howard V.
Zonana, an expert witness who testified that the challenged question would
furnish little or no useful information about applicants' current or future capacity
to practice law.76 The court also noted that the American Psychiatric Association
had taken the position that past psychiatric treatment is not, by itself, indicative
of current impairment.77 The court found the testimony of the Board's expert
witness relatively less persuasive and credible than that of Dr. Zonana 7 8
Dr. Zonana did not suggest, however, that inquiries about mental health
could never be relevant to applicants' fitness to practice law. Instead, he
testified that such inquiries may be necessary as a secondary means of
ascertaining applicants' fitness, asked of applicants only after their initial
responses suggest the presence of a mental disorder.79 In light of this testimony,
the court deferred deciding whether questions about mental health might ever be
70. Id. at 433.
71.Id. at 431.
72. Id. at 433.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 446.
76. Id. at 435. According to the court, Dr. Zonana testified that "there is little
evidence to support the ability of bar examiners, or even mental health professionals, to
predict inappropriate or irresponsible future behavior based on a person's history of
mental health treatment." Id.
77.Id.
78. Id. at 436.
79. Id. at 436 & n.9. Dr. Zonana's support for intrusive questioning about mental
illness in the event of a particularized concern reflects the language of the Fourth
Amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures and which forbids
warrants not predicated on probable cause and not particularly describing the things to
be seized. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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put to applicants without violating the ADA.80 After finding Clark eligible for
protection under the ADA because of her disability or record of impairment,8'
the court went on to conclude that the Board had failed to demonstrate that all
or most of the applicants who had received treatment for mental illness would
"affirmatively threaten the health or safety of the public., 82 The court then went
on to find, like the court in Jacobs, that Question 20(b) unnecessarily
discriminated on the basis of a disability by imposing an extra burden upon
persons with mental disabilities and therefore violated the ADA.83 Also like the
court in Jacobs, the Clark court suggested throughout its opinion that questions
about performance on the job would not violate the Act.
3. Applicants v. Texas State Board ofLaw Examiners
The decision in Applicants v. Texas State Board ofLaw Examiners,m which
preceded the decision in Clark, probably represents the most favorable result for
which a licensing authority can realistically hope. In anticipation of a challenge
under the Act, Texas's examiners changed their questions, limiting their scope
to recent events and such serious mental illness as bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, paranoia, and other psychotic disorders.8 ' When the challenge
80. Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 437 n. 10 (E.D. Va.
1995).
81.Id. at 441.
82. Id. at 442. In addition to the testimony that information about mental illness
was not predictive of ability to practice law, the court also based its decision on the
following: First, empirical evidence suggested that many people failed to acknowledge
to the Board that they had received treatment. Id. at 437. Second, the Board had never
denied a license because of past treatment. Id. Third, the questions deterred individuals
from seeking treatment. Id. at 437-38. Fourth, many states and the National Conference
of Bar Examiners had altered their questions concerning mental illness in light of the
ADA, and the American Bar Association had recommended that examiners limit their
questions about mental health. Id. at 438-41.
83.Id. at 446.
84. No. A 93 CA 740 SS, 1994 WL 923404 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994).
85. Id. at *2-3 & nn.3-5. The question at issue, Question 11, asked:
(a) Within the last ten years, have you been diagnosed with or have you been
treated [for] bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic
disorder?
(b) Have you, since attaining the age of eighteen or within the last ten years,
whichever period is shorter, been admitted to a hospital or other facility for
the treatment of bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other
psychotic disorder?
Id. at *2 n.5. The Board also asked for supplemental information regarding any
affirmative answer to Question 11. Id. at *2. This information included dates of
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came, the district court, exposed to the same arguments as those presented in
Jacobs and Clark, held that the examiners had eliminated the overinclusiveness
of the original questions and that their new questions conformed to the
requirements of the ADA.86 Specifically, and somewhat contrary to the decision
in Clark, the court concluded that Texas had drawn its questions in the "least
intrusive, least discriminatory manner possible. 8 Nor, concluded the court, did
the investigation that would follow an affirmative answer to the questions at
issue impose an unnecessary burden under the ADA." Instead, the court
reasoned that the investigation served the two purposes of protecting the bar and
public, and of providing an opportunity to the applicant to demonstrate present
fitness.89
4. The Impact of the ADA
The ADA has had a significant impact on questions asked by licensing
authorities regarding mental health. According to the court in Clark, bar
examiners in at least eight states-Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas-had changed their questions
because of, or in anticipation of, litigation under the ADA by the time the court
rendered its decision in that case.9° The court in. Clark also reported that four
additional states-Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico, and Utah-had recently
stricken questions about mental illness.9' Furthermore, the legal press regularly
reports additional jurisdictions paring questions in light of the ADA. Nor has the
Act merely had a wide geographic impact; it also has fomented substantial
changes in the questions typically asked. Comparing the results in Jacobs,
Clark, and Texas State Board ofLaw Examiners, the emerging rule appears to
be that the ADA will allow, aside from questions about performance on the job,
at most, only questions about relatively recent treatment for decidedly serious
mental illness.92




90. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 440 (E.D. Va.
1995).
91. Id. at 438.
92. See, e.g., Applicants v. Texas State Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, No. A 93 CA 740 SS,
1994 WL 923404, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994) (upholding "narrowly focused
inquiries and investigation into the mental fitness of applicants ... who have been
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C. Telling the Truth
In light of the enormous impact of the ADA on questions asked about
mental health by licensing authorities, the option of simply telling the truth has
lost much of its significance. If authorities eliminate or limit questions,
applicants will have fewer affirmative answers to give. But many jurisdictions
still ask intrusive or relatively intrusive questions, and people seeking a license
in such places will face the dilemma described earlier.93
But this is only a dilemma if the applicant truly cannot bear the
consequences of revealing the information requested. In many instances, a
straightforward, workable course of action is for the applicant simply to answer
the questions truthfully, place trust in the probity of public officials, and move
on. The state does have a legitimate interest in protecting the public against
unqualified practitioners, and some licensing authorities defend questions about
mental illness as the most effective way of obtaining information about
applicants' fitness.94 Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that officials tend
to use the information responsibly. For example, the executive director of the
Texas Board of Law Examiners told the National Law Journal that the Board
had turned down only one applicant to the bar on the basis of one of its questions
about mental health, and that applicant had applied while confined in a mental
institution following law school.95 Similarly, before the decision in Clark,
Virginia's Board had turned away none of the forty-seven people who had
answered the Board's question about treatment for mental illness in the
affirmative.96 Nevertheless, although answering questions truthfully and trusting
public officials may be the practical answer in many cases, there may be
instances in which it is not,97 and ADA suits are brought as a result. Moreover,
93. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Texas Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *7 (noting that "self-
disclosure-type questions" suffer from the defect that many will answer untruthfully or
fail to "recognize or understand the nature and extent of their illness").
95. Gary Taylor, Suits Hit Mental Health Histories, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 22, 1993, at
3.
96. Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 437 n.12 (E.D. Va.
1995).
97. The level of intrusion presented by licensing authorities can vary widely.
According to the court in Clark, bar examiners in some states asked no questions at all
about mental health at the time that court rendered its decision. See id. at 438. Similarly,
as we have seen in Texas Applicants, Texas asks only about recent, serious mental illness,
and requires only summary supplementary information. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text. Other authorities, however, have been known to ask about a wide
variety of mental illnesses. See generally Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 439-40 (noting that, as
of 1995, bar examiners in 32 states asked "broad questions concerning treatment or
counseling for mental and emotional disorder or illness"). Perhaps the most potentially
intrusive practice of licensing authorities is to require the release of medical records. The
Request for Preparation of a Character Report published by the National Conference of
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as the analysis in the preceding subpart illustrates, suits under the ADA often
prove successful in the sense that people are not required to answer questions
that they consider intrusive about mental illness. But these victories might prove
Pyrrhic in the long run, owing to the price our entire culture may have to pay for
the benefits of the ADA.
IV. WEAKNESSES OF THE MEDICAL MODEL
The ADA's approach to mental illness is an example of the "medical
model" for human suffering. Under this model, unusual, improper, or
undesirable attributes in a human being are ascribed to a defect-a chemical
imbalance, for instance, or a bad gene. In light of the very longstanding
perception that spiritual anguish can have mental and physical manifestations,
however, we should at least hold the medical model suspect. Arguably, it is not
perfectly accurate nor perfectly suited to human nature.98 I propose that we
adopt a model based upon privacy and similar constitutional considerations as
an additional, and perhaps alternative, justification for limiting questions about
mental illness. I make this proposal because declaring oneself mentally
Bar Examiners, upon which some states rely, includes such a release. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS, REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF A CHARACTER REPORT 12
(1997) (requiring applicants who answer a question relating to mental illness in the
affirmative to complete Form 16, which releases medical records). As I argue throughout
this Article, this can constitute an unnecessary and severe interference with both the
therapeutic process and fundamental notions of privacy and human dignity.
98. For one thing, the analysis supporting the medical model necessarily rests on
science. Thus, to the extent scientists can attribute alcoholism, addiction to drugs and
other mental illnesses to immutable physiological characteristics, the categorization of
individuals suffering from these conditions as "disabled" is valid. If not, however, the
categorization is only administratively convenient, and perhaps convenient as a working
classification for a person suffering from mental illness, but inadequate as a means for
identifying the proper response if we want to address the illness at its source.
Our penchant for the medical model has two related foundations. First, we typically
reject spiritual explanations for phenomena. Second, we are comfortable and skilled in
studying, understanding, and mastering physical phenomena. Neumann wrote:
The modem age is an epoch in human history in which science and
technology are demonstrating beyond doubt the capacity of the conscious
mind to deal with physical nature and to master it to a very large extent ....
But it is also an epoch in which man's incapacity to deal with psychic nature,
with the human soul, has become more appallingly obvious than ever before.
NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 25 (footnote omitted). Cf ODAJNYK, supra note 4, at 40
("[T]he Enlightenment view of the psyche as tabula rasa logically demands that mankind
seek the source of all good and evil in the objective environment. Therefore, even when
problems are clearly psychological in origin, the cry still goes up for political and
environmental change to solve them.").
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disabled, although perhaps accurate and although perhaps also a noble act of
humility,99 has philosophical or theological disadvantages.
A. Conflicting Perspectives
As a philosophical or theological matter, the choice presented by the ADA
compels individuals to place themselves in a category that is predicated on a
confession of defect that excuses but that also appears to eliminate all but
medical explanations for the condition. This way of looking at mental illness
trivializes our moral responsibility to ourselves and to our culture to grow and
adapt, particularly in those instances where mental illness is symptomatic of
legitimate uncertainty about who we are and what our role in the world should
be. As the psychiatrist Erich Neumann wrote, it is by looking at the individual
who faces a crisis long before his or her culture that one can best explore the
basis for responding to that crisis:
The study in depth of the psychological development of the
individual in whom the problem of evil becomes manifest is in a much
better position than any research into collective events to detect those
first attempts at a synthesis which are the basic elements of a new
ethic. This is due to the fact that external collective developments are
decades behind the development of the individual, which is like a kind
of avant-garde of the collective and is concerned at a far earlier stage
with the problems which subsequently catch the attention of the
collective as a whole. °
Although Neumann's argument does not explain why psychoanalysis should be
protected from public scrutiny-in fact, it seems to suggest that it should be
publicized-it does explain why mental illness should not be considered
pathological in the sense of the medical model.
99. Humility can certainly be identified as a condition of a healthy psyche. See
EDWARD F. EDINGER, EGO AND ARCHETYPE: INDIVIDUATION AND THE RELIGIOUS
FUNCTION OF THE PSYCHE 137 (1972) (discussing the first Beatitude: "Blessed are the
poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" Matt. 5:3 (King James) (emphasis
removed)). Edinger comments: "Understood psychologically, the meaning [of this
Beatitude] would be: The ego which is aware of its own emptiness of spirit (life
meaning) is in a fortunate position because it is now open to the unconscious and has the
possibility of experiencing the archetypal psyche (the kingdom of heaven)." Id.
The question the ADA does not answer, however, is whether the humility associated
with identifying oneself as "disabled" is an instance of humility in the sense Edinger uses
the word, or simply an excuse for failure to heed a call to undertake a particular moral
responsibility.
100. NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 29.
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Theological and historical illustrations of Neumann's point abound. There
is, for example, the story of Jonah. The Lord called upon Jonah to judge the
people of Nineveh,'0 but he resisted and attempted to flee by ship to no avail.
The Lord then stirred up a fierce storm, causing the sailors to ask: "Why hast
thou done this? For the men knew that he fled from the presence of the Lord."'' 2
There is also the story of the conversion of St. Paul, whose persecution of
Christians and conversion, according to the Bible, ended in a single, literally
blinding stroke.'03 And, in the historical era, there is the story of Martin Luther's
"fit in the choir," interpreted by psychologist Erik Erikson as a manifestation of
a profound inability to reconcile inner tension with the Roman Catholicism of
his day.0 4 These stories suggest that our predecessors associated such myriad
experiences as bad weather, strokes, and fits with spiritual anguish, and not
purely with physical origins.
In contrast with this rich, deep tradition of attributing illness to inner
spiritual turmoil, we have the medical model, which attributes illness solely to
bad genes or a harmful environment. The option proffered by the ADA thus
reduces a panoply of theological or psychological principles (e.g., "wandering
the desert") into medical categories (e.g., depression), which may be helpful in
justifying a diagnosis or prescription, but which ignore the moral imperative that
may be lurking behind the illness. As the psychiatrist Edwin Edinger wrote:
Modem existentialism can be considered as symptomatic of the
collective alienated state. Many current novels and plays depict lost,
meaningless lives. The modem artist seems forced to depict again and
again, to bring home to all of us, the experience of meaninglessness.
However this need not be considered a totally negative phenomenon.
Alienation is not a dead end. Hopefully it can lead to a greater
awareness of the heights and depths of life. 05
The expression of weakness required by the ADA potentially trivializes the
process through which human beings naturally go. Thus, the option of
identifying oneself as mentally disabled in order to obtain privacy for one's
treatment for mental illness may be seen as an unwise solution. Although it will
fit in many instances, in the aggregate it will dissuade people from taking their
distinct psychological make-up seriously. This is not to suggest that psychiatry,
psychology, and 12-step support groups, many of which are at least partly
predicated on the medical model, are illegitimate substitutes for traditional
101. "Arise, go to Nineveh, that great city, and cry against it; for their wickedness
is come up before me." Jonah 1:2.
102. Jonah 1:10.
103. Acts 9:1-4, 8. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2 for excerpts from this
passage.
104. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
105. EDINGER, supra note 99, at 48.
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religion. In fact, these processes may have more in common with traditional
religion than in contrast. The medical model simply may not be perfectly
adapted to human nature.
B. The Argument ad Hominem
Another way of describing the inadequacy of the medical model is by
noting that it ignores the fact that the source of illness may itself be legitimate,
in the sense that it conveys a message that needs to be heeded. By defining an
illness as pathological in an environmental or genetic sense, the medical model
excludes the possibility that the illness has a moral basis that someone should
heed. This, in tum, can justify a type of argument ad hominem.1°  That
argument runs as follows: because one is ill, one cannot be correct. Thus, the
medical model facilitates a species of argument whereby one can describe a
person's convictions, including one's own, as attributable to a defect without
facing the merits of those convictions. It is always possible to tell someone with
whom one disagrees with respect to a matter of dogma that his or her argument
is based upon an infirmity in his or her nature rather than upon a flaw in the
argument itself. Against this type of argument there is no response other than
to deny the existence of the infirmity or to deny the connection between the
infirmity and the argument. In fact, the exchange of arguments between many
Christian heresies and the Roman Catholic Church, as well as many aspects of
the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, can be understood in roughly these
terms.10 7 Consequently, it is helpful to consider the case of one of the first
Protestants, Martin Luther.
C. Martin Luther
Martin Luther was born in 1483, the son of Hans Luder, a miner, and his
wife, Margerete. Desperately in search of a way to reconcile his faith with other
106. Judge Aldisert writes that the fallacy of the argumentum ad hominem "shifts
an argument from the point being discussed (ad rem) to irrelevant personal characteristics
of an opponent (ad hominem). Instead of addressing the issue presented by an opponent,
this argument makes the opponent the issue." RUGIERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR
LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 182 (3d ed. 1997).
107. See generally IAN KER, JOHN HENRYNEWMAN: A BIOGRAPHY 177-78 (1988)
(recounting Newman's argument that the schisms of early Catholicism had more in
common than in contrast with religious debates of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries).
Newman noted in his famous biography his initial appreciation of the means by which
the Roman Catholic Church had responded to heresies. See JOHN HENRY CARDINAL
NEWMAN, APOLOGIA PRO VITA SUA 98-99 (David J. DeLaura ed., 1968). In this passage,
he notes with approval St. Augustine's statement in an epistle against a particular heresy
that "[t]he world judges with assurance that they are not good men who, in whatever part
of the world, separate themselves from the rest of the world." Id. at 98 n.5.
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imperatives instilled in him by his family and his culture, Luther became an
Augustinian monk and later brought himself and countless others out of the fold
of the Roman Catholic Church." 8 In 1958, Erik Erikson published a
psychological biography of Martin Luther as a young man. Erikson used, as a
springboard for his analysis, an incident that occurred when Luther was a monk.
In the middle of a reading, wrote Erikson, Luther
suddenly fell down to the ground in the choir of the monastery at
Erfurt, "raved" like one possessed, and roared with the voice of a bull:
"Ich bin's nit! Ich bin s nit!" or "Non sum! Non sum!"'
1 9
Erikson then identified several interpretations of the so-called "fit in the choir,"
describing the three most prominent of them as those of "the professor [of
Protestant theology]," who interpreted Luther's upsets as coming "straight down
from heaven,"" 0 of "the priest," who ascribed Luther's fits to the work of the
devil,"' and of "the psychiatrist," who classified the fit as "a matter of severest
psychopathology."",12
Erikson's discussion of the priest's"' interpretation of the fit relates to this
Article. Luther argued that his own religious convictions forced him to
challenge certain basic dogma of the Roman Catholic Church." 4 The priest's
108. See generally Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to
Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 1047, 1049-51 (1996) (discussing the beginnings of Lutheranism).
109. ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 23 (footnotes removed). Erikson adds: "The
German version is best translated with 'It isn't me!' [and] the Latin one with 'I am notl"'
ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 23. According to Erikson, the chroniclers of the event agreed
that the text of the reading was Mark 9:17: "And one of the multitude answered and said,
Master, I have brought unto thee my son, which hath a dumb spirit." ERIKSON, supra
note 3, at 23.
110. ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 25-26 (emphasis removed).
111. ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 26-27 (emphasis removed).
112. ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 27-28 (emphasis removed).
113. The "priest" himself was a Dominican monk, Heinrich Denifle, Sub-Archivar
of the Holy See in Rome. ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 26.
114. ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 26. About Luther's trip to speak before the Diet of
Worms, Erikson writes the following:
At Worms Luther faced ostracism and death, not for the sake of an established
creed or ties of ancestry and tradition; he did so because ofpersonal conflict,
derived from inner conflict and still subject to further conflict. The
conscience he spoke of was not an inner sediment of a formalized morality;
it was the best a single man between heaven, hell, and earth could know. If
Luther did not really say the words which became most famous: "Here I
stand," legend again rose to the occasion; for this new credo was for men
whose identity was derived from their determination to stand on their own
feet, not only spiritually, but politically, economically, and intellectually.
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response to his arguments was that the devil possessed Luther, and that neither
Luther nor any of his listeners could rely on anything he believed." 5 The devil,
the priest argued, was stronger than Luther and could cause Luther to believe
and spout heresy. Luther could only respond to the priest by taking his chances
that he (Luther) was right, that the Church would not be able to persecute him,
and that he would not forfeit his soul for his arguments.
The priest's argument is logically coherent, provided one accepts certain
assumptions. If the devil exists, he may have caused Luther to make his
arguments, and Luther may be damned for the things he said and did. There is
no fool-proof defense to the priest's claims, provided one accepts his
premises.'16
But the modem world is substantially based upon Luther's arguments. As
Erikson has argued, Luther completed the work of the Renaissance by freeing
the modem psyche from dogmatic thought."7 Certainly, Luther's liberation has
ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 231.
115. Erikson writes:
For [Denifle] such events as the fit if the choir have only an inner cause,
which in no way means a decent conflict or even an honest affliction, but
solely an abysmal depravity of character. To him, Luther is too much of a
psychopath to be credited with honest mental or spiritual suffering. It is only
the Bad One who speaks through Luther. It is, it must be, Denifle's primary
ideological premise, that nothing, neither mere pathological fits, nor the later
revelations which set Luther on the path to reformation, had anything
whatsoever to do with divine interference. "Who," Denifle asks, in referring
to the thunderstorm [that convinced Luther to seek Holy Orders], "can prove,
for himself, not to speak of others, that the alleged inspiration through the
Holy Ghost really came from above ... and that it was not the play of
conscious or unconscious self-delusion?" Lutheranism, he fears (and hopes
to demonstrate) has tried to lift to the height of dogma the phantasies of a
most fallible mind.
With his suspicion that Luther's whole career may have been inspired
by the devil, Denifle puts his finger on the sorest spot in Luther's whole
spiritual and psychological make-up.
ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 26.
116. Arguably, this form of "argument" has the positive aspect of preserving widely
shared values against transitory or unfounded objections. It is always possible when one
takes a position distinct from others that one's decision to do so is based purely on ego
and not designed to promote anyone's welfare in a meaningful sense. Encouraging
adherence to the main has the independent value of discouraging ideas that are different
but not helpful. Of course, it is not easy to tell one kind of idea from another, nor is it
easy to distinguish responses based on inertia or reactionism from responses based on a
theological form of stare decisis. Ultimately, an idea's appeal to others, or lack thereof,
will validate it or ensure its demise.
117. ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 194-95. Erikson argues as follows:
[O]ne could make a case that Martin, even as he hiked back [from Rome] to
Erfurt [the location of his monastery], was preparing himself to do the dirty
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not lacked a cost, but we have-a great many of us, anyway-taken an
irrevocable step in his direction. If the modem world rejects the priest's
interpretation of Luther's fit, it must choose between attributing it solely to a
"bug" or accepting that mental and physical torment can have a legitimate
spiritual origin.
D. Back to the ADA
Requiring people who suffer from mental illness to obtain protection from
intrusive official questions by claiming status as genetically or environmentally
different re-enacts the problem presented by Erikson's priest. If mental illness
arises from a formal distinguishing characteristic, persons suffering from such
illness and everyone else can dismiss their plight as symptomatic of an
abnormality. In fact, persons "suffering the illness" may have a message for all
of us; there may be no pathology. They may simply suffer what Luther
suffered-the intense discomfort of finding fault with a prevailing state of
affairs. The medical model, to its disadvantage, is based on an odd concept of
a platonic "person," whose genes are unobjectionable and who has no
work of the Renaissance, by applying some of the individualistic principles
immanent in the Renaissance to the Church's still highly fortified
homeground-the conscience of ordinary man. The Renaissance created
ample leeway for those in art and science who had their work confirmed by
its fruits, that is, by aesthetic, logical, and mathematical verification. It freed
the visualizer and the talker, the scholar and the builder-without, however,
establishing either a truly new and sturdy style of life, or a new and workable
morality. The great progress in pictorialization, verbalization, and material
construction left, for most the people, something undone on an inner frontier.
We should not forget that on his deathbed Lorenzo the Magnificent, who died
so young and so pitifully soon after he had withdrawn to the country to devote
the rest of his life to the "enjoyment of leisure with dignity," sent for
Savonarola [a noted cleric]. Only the most strongly principled among
Lorenzo's spiritual critics would do as his last confessor.
ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 194. Erikson writes shortly afterward:
Hans' son was made for ajob on this frontier [left open by the Renaissance].
But he did not create the job; it originated in the hypertrophy of the negative
conscience inherent in our whole Judeo-Christian heritage in which, as Luther
put it: "Christ becomes more formidable a tyrant and a judge than was
Moses." But the negative conscience can become hypertrophied only when
man hungers for his identity.
We must accept this universal, if weird, frontier of the negative
conscience as the circumscribed locus of Luther's work. If we do, we will be
able to see that the tools he used were those of the Renaissance: fervent return
to the original texts; determined anthropocentrism (if in Christocentric form);
and the affirmation of his own organ of genius and of craftsmanship, namely,
the voice of the vernacular.
ERIKSON, supra note 3, at 195.
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predisposition toward addiction or mental illness."' But if the perfect person is
invariably someone who adjusts easily to life and the world as he or she finds
them (i.e., someone unlike Martin Luther), our world is unlikely ever to change.
There would be no prophets calling us to our better selves." 9
This does not mean, of course, that people cannot be mentally ill. They
certainly can be, in the sense that one can point to objective manifestations of
mental illness, as identified by common sense or by the professional community.
Nor does it mean that mental illness cannot have genetic or physical
explanations. Moreover, no matter what the source of mental illness, its only
effective treatment may often be medical. But experience suggests that not
every instance of what we would now call mental illness ought to be ascribed to
a physical defect for which its sufferer has no responsibility. Instead, in some
instances we should look upon mental illness as an instruction to its sufferer to
make waves, or to learn to live with a personality that defies generally accepted
118. Cf ODAJNYK, supra note 4, at 37-38. Odajnyk writes:
Jung argues that it is an error to follow the rationalistic principles of the
Enlightenment to their logical conclusion and attempt to subject all personal
and social phenomena to a rational will. He thinks that it has never been
shown that life and the world are rational; on the contrary, there are "good
grounds for supposing that they are irrational, or rather than in the last resort
they are grounded beyond human reason.... Hence reason and the will that
is grounded in reason are valid only up to a point." Beyond that point, reason
excludes the irrational possibilities of life, thus engendering distortions, and
then is surprised and overpowered by the compensations that such distortions
beget.
ODAJNYK, supra note 4, at 37-38 (footnote omitted).
119. William James wrote:
[R]eligious geniuses have often shown symptoms of nervous instability. Even
more perhaps than other kinds of genius, religious leaders have been subject
to abnormal psychical visitations. Invariably they have been creatures of
exalted emotional sensibility. Often they have led a discordant inner life, and
had melancholy during part of their career. They have known no measure,
been liable to obsessions and fixed ideas; and frequently they have fallen into
trances, heard voices, seen visions, and presented all sorts of peculiarities
which are ordinarily classed as pathological.
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE
6-7 (32d ed. 1920). Neumann noted the importance of individual growth to the
development of the collective as follows:
From one point of view, the new ethic is an individual ethic .... It
formulates a unique task of each individual.... which is to grapple with his
own specific moral problems as they arise out of his own psycho-social
constitution and destiny. But the other aspect of the new ethic... is precisely
the collective significance of the individual which it entails. What we spoke
of as the stability of the psychic structure is... most vitally relevant to the
collective.
NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 128.
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categories. 2 By basing limitations on intrusive questions about mental health
on principles divorced from any concept of "disability," we preserve the power
of people to argue that their problems are not categorically distinct from
everyone else's.' We should not cast aside thousands of years of explaining
mental illness in terms of religion, or more recently, psychology, with the
sudden emergence of the medical model, particularly where we can defer the
issue by resort to constitutionally protected rights.'22
120. See NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 80-81 ("In the end, the individual is brought
face to face with the necessity for 'accepting' his own evil.").
121. Concededly, this is a very difficult argument to make, for just as we may have
legitimate contributions to make to our culture, so too we are called not to be egocentric
or solipsistic. We are all flawed, and the greatest flaw of all is the inability to admit that
we have one. As psychologist Edwin Edinger wrote:
The Greeks had a tremendous fear of what they called hybris. In original
usage this term meant wanton violence or passion arising from pride. It is
synonymous with one aspect of [what Edinger calls] inflation. Hybris is the
human arrogance that appropriates to man what belongs to the gods. It is the
transcending of proper human limits.
EDINGER, supra note 99, at 31. Similarly, writing about the myth of Daedalus and Icarus,
Edinger observes:
In this myth the dangerous aspect of inflation is emphasized. Although there
are times when an inflated act is necessary to achieve a new level of
consciousness, there are other times when it is foolhardy and disastrous....
As Nietzsche said, "Many a one hath cast away his final worth when he hath
cast away his servitude."
EDINGER, supra note 99, at 27 (quoting Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF NiETZCHE 65 (1942)). As Edinger suggests, however, some
emergence of the ego is necessary for psychological health. EDINGER, supra note 99, at
26. The matter is not easy. Again Edinger:
These two myths [of the Garden of Eden and of Prometheus] say essentially
the same thing because they are expressing the archetypal reality of the psyche
and its course of development. The acquisition of consciousness is a crime,
an act of hybris against the powers-that-be; but it is a necessary crime, leading
to a necessary alienation from the natural unconscious state of wholeness. If
we are going to hold any loyalty to the development of consciousness, we
must consider it a necessary crime. It is better to be conscious than to remain
in the animal state. But in order to emerge at all, the ego is obliged to set
itself up against the unconscious out of which it came and assert its relative
autonomy by an inflated act.
EDINGER, supra note 99, at 25.
122. Although it would be well beyond the scope of this Article, another potential
danger of the ADA and its dependence upon the medical model is the model's tendency
to put people in groups based on characteristics, and then to set them against each other.
Odajnyk writes:
[A]lthough they may alleviate certain pressing problems, political movements
do not really solve them, and in fact, have a number of pernicious effects. For
instance, by uniting individuals into groups, political movements constellate
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR LIMITING QUESTIONS ABOUT
MENTAL HEALTH
Protection against intrusive questions about treatment for mental illness can
find roots in several provisions of the federal Constitution, particularly the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, and the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth
Amendment.
A. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the federal and state governments, respectively, from depriving any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Since the nineteenth
century, courts have interpreted these clauses to include a so-called
"substantive" component, pursuant to which governments are barred from acting
arbitrarily-in the constitutional sense of the word-no matter how correct the
"process" by which they effect the deprivation. 24 In the constitutional sense, the
government acts arbitrarily and therefore without due process when it pursues
illegitimate ends, when it pursues legitimate ends by means that will not promote
that end, and when, in the pursuit of a legitimate end, it unnecessarily tramples
rights widely and deeply valued in the culture. Over time, courts have
recognized dozens of rights entitled to this extra level of protection from
"arbitrary" legislation.'25
the forces of the collective unconscious and produce the harmful effects
associated with psychic inflation.
ODAJNYK, supra note 4, at 41.
123. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
124. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986). As Justice Rehnquist
wrote in that case: "[B]y barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them, [the Due Process Clause] serves to prevent
governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression." Id. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
309, 322-23 (1993).
125. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-87 (1978) (recognizing right
to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (recognizing right to procure an
abortion during the first two trimesters of pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) (suggesting, if not recognizing, a right of a single person to obtain
contraceptive drugs or devices); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(recognizing right of a married person to use a contraceptive device); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (recognizing right not to have one's stomach
pumped to remove swallowed pills); cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (strongly suggesting a right of a competent person to refuse
unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment).
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One particular kind of legislation that courts will subject to close scrutiny
is legislation that intrudes upon privacy, either individual or associational. This
protection of privacy has taken two distinct forms. First, it has come to protect
certain personal decisions from official interference, no matter how publicly
these decisions might have to be carried out. An example of this would be a
woman's decision to abort a pregnancy, to which the Supreme Court has
extended a significant amount of constitutional protection. 6 However privately
or publicly a woman deliberates over her decision to have an abortion, the
Constitution protects not so much those deliberations as the relatively public
procedures that would be used to carry it out. In fact, the Court suggested at one
time that the decision to terminate a pregnancy inheres in a woman together with
her doctor, and not merely in her alone.'27 Similarly, the Court has often upheld
laws requiring minors to obtain parental or judicial permission before procuring
an abortion.' This language and these holdings are inconsistent with protecting
the privacy of deliberations per se. Instead, they function as a cognate of the
non-justiciability doctrine. Just as the Supreme Court will decline to resolve an
issue that the Constitution explicitly calls upon another branch of the federal
government to decide, 29 so the Court has withdrawn from all governmental
officials general authority to prohibit abortion.
For the most part, however, this is not the type of privacy that would protect
conversations between the mentally ill and therapists, because there would
almost certainly be no decision at issue that the government could second-guess.
Instead, one might look to the second aspect of constitutional privacy. In giving
shape to this second aspect of privacy, the Court has interpreted the Constitution
to protect certain domains from public scrutiny, some individual, others
associational, without regard to things caused by or affected by events or
decisions in that domain. The best example of this aspect of privacy is presented
by Griswold v. Connecticut,30 a case involving marital privacy.
126. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recognizing a
constitutionally protected right, in most instances, of a woman to abort a pregnancy
before the fetus becomes viable); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66 (originally identifying
such a right).
127. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66.
128. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 899.
129. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In Baker, the Court noted that one
justification for a court to dismiss a case as presenting a non-justiciable political question
is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department." Id.
130. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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1. Griswold v. Connecticut
At issue in Griswold was a Connecticut statute that punished the use of any
contraceptive drug or device.3 3 Griswold, the executive director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Buxton, medical director at one of the
League's offices, 32 gave medical advice to "married persons as to the means of
preventing conception."'33 They also examined married women and prescribed
the appropriate contraceptive devices for their use. 34 The state obtained
convictions against Griswold and Buxton for assisting couples in the use of a
contraceptive device, and the state appellate courts affirmed their convictions.'
35
By a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court was brief, yet memorable. In that
opinion, he described a universe of unenumerated constitutional rights
emanating from and adding depth to the explicit guarantees of the document.
His argument was partly logical and partly historical. First, he noted that the
Court had recognized a number of rights not protected by the text of the
Constitution, yet flowing from its explicit provisions.'36 For example, he noted
that the Constitution itself does not confer a general right of association, right
to educate one's child at the school of one's choice, or right to have one's
children study a particular subject or learn a particular foreign language. 3 7 Yet,
he observed, the Court had recognized each of these rights in cases construing
the First Amendment. 38 This led him to conclude that the specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have "penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance."'139 Thus, he said, the various
guarantees explicitly set forth in the Constitution create "zones of privacy."' 40
Moving away from the First Amendment, he speculated that many of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights-the Third and Fourth Amendments, the Fifth
131. Id. at 480 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)).
132. Id.
133. Id. (emphasis removed).
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 482.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 482-83 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (recognizing a general right to association arising from the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech)); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1925) (recognizing
a right to have one's children taught in German); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1923) (recognizing a right to send one's children to parochial school).
139. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367
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Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, and the Ninth
Amendment-create their own zones of privacy.'
4
'
Applying this reasoning to the case at hand, Justice Douglas suggested that
the right to privacy included the right of a married couple to use a contraceptive
device free from official scrutiny.142 But he did not couch his argument in such
specific terms. Rather, he focused on the nature of the relationship between
husband and wife, suggesting that its deliberations or transactions simply were
none of the government's business, at least barring an overwhelming need to
intrude.
41
By focusing on the value of marital privacy, however that privacy is used,
Justice Douglas's basis for deciding Griswold added a significant dimension to
the constitutional right to privacy. Although the effect of the Court's decision
in that case was to enable married couples to use contraceptives, the Court's
decision appeared to rest much less on this type of "privacy" than on the idea of
protecting the marital relationship from official scrutiny. Justice Douglas
described this relationship as a source of strength and a matrix for development:
Marriage is the coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions) 44
The approach to privacy articulated in the ratio decidendi of Griswold
strongly supports the argument that the Constitution protects conversations
between therapists and their patients. If we accept the premise that the
"penumbras" and "emanations" of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights
protect relationships that facilitate the building of character from external
scrutiny, it follows that we should protect the privacy of the therapeutic process.
Although Griswold best supports this argument, the Court has decided other
supporting cases.
2. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Court addressed the question
whether, consistently with the First Amendment, the State of Alabama could
compel the NAACP to reveal the names and addresses of its members within the
141. Id.
142. Id. at 485-86.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 486.
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state.145 Although the First Amendment protects neither public nor secret
association expressly, the Court decided that Alabama could not compel
production of the names in the circumstances presented.
46
The case began when the Attorney General brought a suit in equity in state
court to establish, among other things, that the NAACP was a foreign
corporation doing business in Alabama without complying with the state's
requirements for such corporations. 47 To support this contention, the state
sought the names of the NAACP's members and "agents" living in the state.
a4
The judge ordered the NAACP to produce the names. 149 The NAACP refused
to comply on the grounds that disclosure of its members' names would subject
many of them to harassment and retaliation.1 50 Eventually the NAACP agreed
to register as a foreign corporation, but not before the state court held it in
contempt for failing to produce the list of its members.5' The case reached the
Supreme Court on the NAACP's petition for review by certiorari of this
judgment of contempt.
In a carefully written opinion, Justice Harlan concluded that Alabama could
not constitutionally compel disclosure of the names of the NAACP's
members. 52 He began by observing that the First Amendment protects not only
the right to speak freely, but also the right to associate. 53 He then reasoned that
government need not intend to interfere with association for a constitutional
violation to occur. 54 Instead, he noted, courts would subject an official action
that has the "effect of curtailing the freedom to associate" to "the closest
scrutiny."'155 He found such an effect here. Privacy, he reasoned, is often vital
to association.'56 Justice Harlan wrote: "Inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs."' 57
Having concluded, therefore, that the Court should subject Alabama's order to
the closest scrutiny, Justice Harlan then asked whether Alabama's purpose in
requiring production of the members' names would satisfy this level of
scrutiny.5 8 By that time, the NAACP had admitted its presence in the state and
145. Id. at 451.
146. Id. at 465-66.
147. Id. at 451-52.
148. Id. at 453.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 462.
151. Id. at 453-54.
152. Id. at 466.
153. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 460.
154. Id. at 461-62.
155. Id. at 460-61.
156. Id. at 462.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 463.
1999]
31
Salamanca: Salamanca:Constitutional Protection for Conversations between Therapists and Clients
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
had agreed to comply with the state's requirements.'5 9 Consequently, he
reasoned, the state had no continuing interest in the names sufficient to justify
the deterrent effect their disclosure would have upon the members' right to
associate freely.
60
Like Griswold, which the Court would decide seven years later, Patterson
supports the argument that privacy in a relationship can be integral to the
exercise of rights specifically embraced by the First Amendment. Although the
"relationships" at issue in Patterson were neither intimate nor comprehensive,
they nevertheless facilitated the development and expression of ideas, thereby
implicating the First Amendment. By extending constitutional protection to
these relationships, the Patterson Court recognized that association can be a
fertile source of new ideas. This supports the argument that the Constitution
should protect the relationship between therapist and patient.' 6'
159. Id. at 464-65.
160. Id. at 466.
161. The Supreme Court has never expressly held that due process forbids the
collection of patient-specific information relating to mental illness. It has noted,
however, that official collection of medical information relating to individuals at least
implicates due process. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977), the Court reviewed
New York's practice of recording the names of all those for whom a doctor had
prescribed certain drugs for which an unlawful market existed. Although the Court
appeared to assume that, in the proper case, due process could block the state from
obtaining this kind of information, it nevertheless upheld the practice in light of the
state's concern about the illegal traffic in drugs and in light of the relatively minor and
speculative nature of the intrusion into patients' lives. Id. at 598-604. Concurring,
Justice Brennan argued that technical developments in the ability to store information
could necessitate revisiting the issues presented in the case. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Building on Whalen, other courts have held that due process protects the
confidentiality of records relating to mental illness, at least to some extent. In Hawaii
Psychiatric Society v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1052 (D. Hawaii 1979), for example,
the court issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the State of Hawaii from issuing
"administrative inspection warrants" for the mental health records of recipients of
Medicaid. The court expressly based its opinion on the right to privacy, among other
things. Id. at 1038-39, 1043. In Ariyoshi, the state asserted an interest in protecting its
Medicaid program from fraud. Id. at 1041. Although the court credited the state's
interest, it nevertheless concluded that inspection of patients' records was unnecessary
to promote this interest. Id. at 1041, 1045. Other courts have permitted official access
to information about mental illness while noting that such access at least implicates due
process. In Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977), for instance, the Ninth Circuit recognized that due process protects the
confidentiality of communications between therapist and patient at least somewhat, see
id. at 1067-68, but went on to uphold a district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus
to a therapist who had refused to disclose information about a patient. Id. at 1070.
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that requiring the disclosure threatened
constitutionally protected rights, the court concluded that the state's interest in obtaining
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But substantive due process is not the only constitutional doctrine that
potentially offers such protection. Because of the close affinity between
religious confessional relationships and the therapeutic process, the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment may also offer such protection.
B. Free Exercise of Religion
Although religion and psychology are arguably discrete phenomena, they
partake of the same process-that of helping the individual to find some sort of
peace with him or herself. In fact, Carl Jung described human beings' religious
nature as an empirically verifiable aspect of the psyche. 62 He suggested that a
psychiatrist can consider his or herjob done when a patient "quietly slip[s] back
to the order of the Church," provided the religion fits. 63  Similarly, the
evidence outweighed the patient's interest in that case in keeping the information
confidential. Id. Finally, in a fairly recent opinion, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia refused to enjoin a series of questions that the Department
of Defense posed to its civilian personnel. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.
Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 295 (1993). One of these questions solicited a Complete history
of employees' mental health and use of drugs and alcohol, and required disclosure of any
counseling received from a mental health professional. Id. at 287. Although the court
seemed to recognize a vague constitutional right at stake, id. at 293-94, it vacated the
preliminary injunction issued by the district court forbidding the Department to compel
employees to answer the questions. Id. at 295. The circuit court reasoned that the
plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail in showing that their interest in privacy outweighed the
government's interest in a functional, trustworthy military. See id. at 294-95.
These decisions demonstrate that courts are aware that intrusive questions about
treatment for mental illness may implicate due process, even though they may give such
implications scant consideration. See generally Smith, supra note 30, at 495-502. They
also reflect the generally intelligent approach to the issue of comparing the government's
needs against those of the individual. In particular, these cases indicate that courts will
look skeptically at official questions about treatment for mental illness that do not arise
from an activity involving a high degree of responsibility to the public or some form of
particularized concern. A court applying the general reasoning of these cases to the
issues presented in this article could well come to the conclusion that I advocate. But
such issues are no longer likely to come to the fore, given the ADA.
162. See, e.g., 18 C.G. JUNG, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG 692, at 289
(Sir Herbert Read et al. eds., 1955) ("Science has to consider what there is. There is
religion, and it is one of the most essential manifestations of the human mind.").
163. Id. 671, at 285. Noted Jung:
[I]t must be something that has substance and form. It is by no means true
that when one analyses somebody he necessarily jumps into the future. He is
perhaps meant for a church, and if he can go back into a church, perhaps that
is best thing that can happen. [If he cannot,] [t]hen there is trouble; then he
has to go on the Quest; then he has to find out what his soul says; then he has
to go through the solitude of land that is not created.
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psychiatrist Edwin Edinger argued that individuation, the process by which
people come to accept themselves in a profound sense, potentially substitutes for
the right relationship of the ego to the "Self' that religion effects in a cohesive
traditional society. 164 As Edinger wrote:
If when the individual is thrown back on himself through the loss of
a projected religious value, he is able to confront the ultimate
questions of life that are posed for him, he may be able to use this
opportunity for a decisive development in consciousness. If he is able
to work consciously and responsibly with the activation of the
unconscious he may discover the lost value, the god-image, within the
psyche .... The connection between ego and Self is now consciously
realized. In this case the loss of a religious projection has served a
salutary purpose; it has been the stimulus which leads to the
development of an individuated personality.161
Given this professional testimony that individuation can substitute for or
facilitate religious development, it should follow that the values animating the
Free Exercise Clause should extend to protect the relationship between patient
and therapist. In fact, the Supreme Court laid some of the groundwork for this
argument over thirty years ago in United States v. Seeger,166 when it first
indicated a receptiveness to a functional definition of religion. In Seeger, the
Court considered several draftees' claims that they were entitled to statutory
exemptions from combat as conscientious objectors even though they were not
adherents of any "religion" in the traditional sense of the word. The statute at
issue, the Universal Military Training and Service Act, exempted from combat
"those persons who by reason of their religious training and belief [were]
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."' 67 It further
defined the term "religious training and belief' as "an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."' 16
Seeger's difficulty lay in the fact that he was unsure about the existence of
a "Supreme Being," but espoused a "belief in and devotion to goodness and
virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed."' 69 The
Court, nevertheless, held that Seeger qualified for the exemption.' 0 After
164. EDINGER, supra note 99, at 68.
165. EDINGER, supra note 99, at 68.
166. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
167. Id. at 164-65 (quoting Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4560) (1958)).
168. Id. at 165 (alteration in original).
169. Id. at 166.
170. Id. at 187.
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examining the history of the statute and its predecessors, the Court concluded
that, in defining "religious training and belief' to require "relation to a Supreme
Being," Congress had meant only to clarify that the exemption did not include
those whose opposition to fighting was based on ephemeral or elective views. 7 '
Instead, the Court reasoned, a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory
definition."'"
The reasoning of Seeger supports the argument that the Constitution should
protect people's religious activities as they actually take place, and not solely as
they might occur in the context of a traditional church. Although the polity
could not afford to protect every conceivable activity that profoundly contributes
to the development of the psyche, we can look to what we already protect as
integral to religion and ask what quasi-confessional relationships should qualify
for similar protection. 74 Every jurisdiction in the United States currently
extends an evidentiary privilege to conversations between clergy and the
penitent. Presumably, no licensing authority would require applicants to
release the records of a classic confessional relationship. 76 It is simply one step
171. Id. at 165.
172. Id. at 176.
173. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
174. Although the Supreme Court has largely abandoned the project of relieving
religious free exercise from incidental yet substantial burdens, see Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-85, 890 (1990), legislators and licensing officials are still at
liberty to take such matters into account, barring establishment of religion. Moreover,
the Court itself expressed a willingness to make exactly such decisions before Smith. See
Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398,403-04 (1963) (concluding that denying unemployment
benefits to a person who could not work on Saturdays for religious reasons imposed a
burden upon her exercise of religion). Moreover, the Court has routinely demonstrated
a willingness to assess burdens on the exercise of other fundamental rights, such as the
right to procure an abortion, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)
(O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ., plurality opinion), or the right to associate for the
purpose of expression, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461-63
(1958).
175. Chad Homer, Beyond the Confines of the Confessional: The Priest-Penitent
Privilege in a Diverse Society, 45 DRAKE L. REv. 697, 703-04 (1997).
176. It is unclear, however, whether the Constitution would forbid such a
requirement. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1992) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause does not generally require a state to create exemptions from neutral,
generally applicable laws). On the other hand, some members of the Supreme Court have
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from this to a general rule requiring some form of particularized concern before
an applicant must release records of treatment for mental illness.'77
This state of affairs, in which licensing authorities can inquire into a
functionally confessional relationship between therapist and patient, arguably
implicates the Free Exercise Clause. Asking a person to reveal conversations
between him or herself and a therapist arguably threatens fundamental precepts
of religious or quasi-religious growth. Such matters are intimate, personal, and
often highly subjective. Their exposure to external scrutiny could jeopardize the
process.
There are, however, at least two potential glitches in this argument. First,
relatively recent case law suggests that the Free Exercise Clause might not bar
the application of a general requirement that applicants release records of
therapeutic or even confessional relationships to licensing authorities. 78 Second,
there must be practical limits to what the clause protects, lest anyone with a
fundamental personal objection to a law or policy might qualify for distinct
treatment, hardly a condition of a society governed by law.79
The Free Exercise Clause has enjoyed, or suffered through, a remarkable
ride over the last decade or so. Until 1990, case law arising under the clause
suggested that neither the states nor the federal government could impose a
substantial burden upon the free exercise of religion unless such imposition was
necessary to promote a compelling public interest."' In 1990, in Employment
Division v. Smith,' the Supreme Court either clarified or limited this precedent,
holding that uniform laws of general applicability that impose an incidental
burden on the exercise of religion do not violate the First Amendment. 8 2 In
Smith, Native American employees of a rehabilitation program were laid off for
177. Many jurisdictions, including the federal courts, also recognize an evidentiary
privilege for conversations between therapists and their patients. See, e.g., Jaffe v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1996) (recognizing a federal evidentiary privilege). But
neither the priest-penitent nor the therapist-patient privilege would likely protect
applicants from intrusive questions about mental health. First, these privileges typically
extend only to "testimony," which would not include answers to administrative questions
or releases of records for administrative review. Second, in most states the privilege only
permits the patient or penitent to bind the therapist or clergyman, not vice versa. See
Homer, supra note 175, at 704. Third, even where the privilege does run both ways, it
might well be that only the therapist or clergyman can bind the patient or penitent. See,
e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (McKinney 1992).
178. See infra notes 180-95 and accompanying text.
179. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
180. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15, 227 (1972) (allowing people
of a certain religious sect to remove their children from school after the eighth grade);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (requiring a state unemployment
commission to pay benefits to a person who could not accept work on Saturdays because
of her religion).
181. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
182. Id. at 881-82.
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ingesting peyote in connection with their religion." 3 The state denied them
unemployment relief on the grounds that Oregon punished the use of peyote.184
The Supreme Court rejected the workers' challenge to the denial on the basis of
the Free Exercise Clause.1
85
For a period of time after Smith, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA") , 8 6 purportedly enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 7 prohibited states from imposing substantial
obstacles upon religious practices. Specifically, RFRA provided that no
"government," including both the states and the federal government, could
"substantially burden" free exercise, even if the burden resulted from a rule of
general applicability, unless that burden promoted a compelling public interest
and was the least restrictive means of doing so.1 8 Because official inquiries
about treatment for a mental illness might intrude upon a confessional
relationship between clergy and penitent, or, as I note, upon a quasi-confessional
relationship between therapist and patient, RFRA might have limited such
inquiries. The Supreme Court declared the Act unconstitutional, however, in
City of Boerne v. Flores,'89 concluding that Congress lacked power under
Section 5 to enact legislation not "proportionate" to perceived violations of the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Arrendment.Y9 Because the Supreme
Court struck down RFRA, the protection I advocate would depend on broad
interpretation of the exceptions to Smith,'9 or abandonment of that decision by
the Court.'
92
There is at least one exception to Smith's basic rule that might support the
position I advocate. In his opinion for the Court in Smith, Justice Scalia
183. Id. at 872.
184. Id. at 874-76. In fact, the state first determined that the employees were
ineligible for benefits because of "work-related misconduct." Id. at 874. The state later
argued that the denial of benefits was permissible because the ingesting of peyote was a
crime. Id. at 875.
185. Id. at 882.
186. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1448 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)).
187. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress power to
enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
These substantive provisions include the Due Process Clause, which the Supreme Court
has held incorporates the Free Exercise Clause. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 305 (1940).
188.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a), -1(b), -2(1) (1994).
189. 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
190. Id. at 2171 ("The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be
achieved.").
191. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
192. At least two justices have expressed dissatisfaction with Smith. See Flores,
117 S. Ct. at 2157, 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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distinguished the case before him from a situation implicating "hybrid" rights,
which draw strength from the Free Exercise Clause as well as at least one other
provision of the Constitution. 9 3 He gave as examples the conjunction of free
exercise with freedom of the press or with the prerogatives of parenthood. 94
Most importantly, however, he gave as an example the conjunction of free
exercise with freedom of association. 5 With this in mind, one could argue that
the association of therapist and patient, like the association of clergy and
penitent, merits heightened protection under the Constitution.
Of course, there must be limits to what the Free Exercise Clause can
protect; otherwise we could hardly say that we live in a society governed by
law. 96 Moreover, secularists might understandably object when they are asked
to bear a burden from which the law relieves others because of their asserted
religious beliefs. But the less parochially we define religion the less likely it
would be that such an objection would arise. Moreover, neither Smith nor any
limitation inherent in the Free Exercise Clause prevents licensing authorities
from unilaterally modifying their questions in light of the concerns I am raising.
Furthermore, any rule as broad as the one I advocate would not appear to
implicate the Establishment Clause. 97
So far, I have tried to identify two possible constitutional bases for limiting
intrusive questions about treatment for mental illness: a logical extension of
substantive due process and a "functional" application of the Free Exercise
Clause. I will now seek to identify a third, based upon the Fourth Amendment.
C. The Fourth Amendment
As a matter of plain text, perhaps the most obvious constitutional protection
from intrusive questions about treatment for mental illness lies in the Search and
193. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
194. Id. at 881.
195. Id. at 882 ("[I]t is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of
association grounds would... be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.").
196. As Justice Scalia argued for the Court in Smith:
[I]f "compelling interest" really means what it says ... many laws will not
meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy,
but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of
religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.
Precisely because we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference, and precisely because we value and
protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of
conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
Id. at 888 (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
197. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (upholding New
York's practice of exempting churches from property taxes because it also exempted
several categories of nonprofit groups).
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Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment.1 98 At least to a modem ear, this
clause speaks directly in terms of privacy, offering "security" in one's "person,
house, papers, and effects."'199 Although these nouns all refer to tangible things,
a modem reader of the clause would most likely discern an underlying intention
to protect those physical aspects of a person's life most closely associated with
psychic privacy. If so, one could persuasively argue that a request for detailed
information about one's conversations with a therapist, absent particularized
concern, 20 constitutes an "unreasonable" search or seizure.
There are, however, at least three potential objections to this argument.
First, one could argue from text that the framers of the Fourth Amendment
intended to limit the clause's scope to official searches and seizures of tangible
property. Surely eighteenth-century thinkers, imbued with the spirit of John
Locke, would have concerned themselves primarily with protecting such
property.2°' Second, one could argue that licensing authorities do not literally
require applicants to discuss or release information about their conversations
with therapists. They merely make such discussion or release a prerequisite to
acquiring a license.202 Finally, one could argue that, although the Fourth
Amendment might apply to the practices of licensing authorities, it would not
bar such practices.03 Closer examination of these objections, however, reveals
that none is cogent.
The objection that the Fourth Amendment applies only to searches and
seizures of tangible property is not persuasive for two reasons. First, it is beside
the point. In the ordinary course of events, licensing authorities will almost
certainly require an applicant who has received treatment for mental illness to
submit at least some tangible item, typically a release of records in the
198. The Clause provides, in part, that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
200. In numerous cases arising under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
has worked out the concept of "particularized" concern. Typically, this concern refers
to an articulable reason why an officer believes he or she should stop a specific person
for brief questioning. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("[I]n justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."). The Fourth Amendment, which requires that warrants rest upon "probable
cause, . . .particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or items to be
seized," U.S. CONST. amend. IV, reflects this same approach, albeit with a higher
standard than that required in Terry. See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983) (defining probable cause as whether, given all the information presented to the
issuing authority by way of affidavit, there is a "fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place").
201. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 208-19 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 220-34 and accompanying text.
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possession of third parties.2" Second, and far more importantly, the Supreme
Court has rejected any requirement that the Fourth Amendment governs only the
seizure of tangible items."0 5 Consequently, a requirement that applicants submit
words in response to their questions would trigger the clause. As the Supreme
Court held in Katz v. United States,206 a seminal decision regarding the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, the Search and Seizure Clause protects people in those
places in which they have a reasonable expectation of privacy.0 7
The objection that licensing authorities do not force applicants to release
private information, but merely require them to do so in exchange for a license
is not forcibly persuasive because, if true, it proves too much. The Supreme
Court has struck down many similar requirements as imposing "unconstitutional
conditions" upon the exercise of a privilege, although admittedly it has upheld
others. In Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters,20 8
for example, the Court held that a federal regulation requiring public
broadcasters who received certain grants to refrain from editorializing on the air
violated the First Amendment, notwithstanding the fact that the government had
no pre-existing obligation to make the grants available.2° In that case, the Court
held that the government's interest in not paying for the expression of private
views with public money was insufficient to justify a flat ban on editorials by
broadcasters receiving the grants, given the relatively small amount of money
204. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Clause to apply to the search or seizure of many forms of property other than the
paradigmatic search of a dwelling for a bloody knife. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n.,
489 U.S. 325, 33-37 (1985)) (urine); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (dried
blood scraped from underneath a fingernail); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (oral statements); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (blood).
Needless to say, any request for or seizure of "papers" would fall squarely within the text
of the Clause.
205. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements.").
206. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
207. Id. at 351-52. In Katz, federal agents tapped a public telephone booth and
eavesdropped on Katz as he placed bets over the phone. Id. at 348. The Court ordered
the suppression of the fruits of the wiretap, reasoning that, by shutting the door of the
phone booth, Katz had manifested an expectation of privacy that society was prepared to
respect. Id. at 352.
Before Katz, a "search," for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, had to involve
what a court would have considered a "trespass" at common law. See, e.g., Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 466 (1928) (refusing to find a search where federal
agents tapped the wires running to Olmstead's telephone without trespassing on his
property). The Supreme Court declined to follow Olmstead in Katz. See Katz, 389 U.S.
at 353.
208.468 U.S. 364 (1984).
209. Id. at 402.
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the government made available.2 0 Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner,2' a case
arising under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court held that South Carolina could
not make the receipt of unemployment benefits contingent upon a would-be
recipient's willingness to forego religious scruples and work on Saturdays,
particularly where the burden upon the state of making individual exceptions
would be light.'12 Decisions such as League of Women Voters and Sherbert
demonstrate that the government may not categorically justify infringing upon
a constitutional right on the grounds that it confers a voluntary benefit or
privilege in exchange. Instead, the government must justify the infringement in
context. And in fact it has on many occasions. In Vernonia SchoolDistrict 47J
v. Acton,1 3 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a school district's
requirement that all participants in the district's athletics program submit to
random urinalysis for evidence of the use of illegal drugs. 21 4 Similarly, in Snepp
v. United States,215 the Court held that the Central Intelligence Agency could
regulate speech by its employees concerning their work for the Agency.1 6
The cases discussed in the previous paragraph suggest that courts will
require some proportionality and relation between a condition imposed and a
benefit or privilege conferred.27 The standard tests for due process, however,
require the courts to ask roughly the same questions.2 8 Consequently, the
constitutionality of a "condition" to the receipt of a benefit or privilege turns on
many of the same factors as the constitutionality of a coercive requirement.219
I will now turn to that question.
The third potential objection to my argument is that, however broad the
scope of the Fourth Amendment, it does not bar licensing authorities from
asking intrusive questions about treatment for mental illness because such
210. Id. at 400-02.
211. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
212. Id. at 410.
213. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
214. Id. at 664-65.
215. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
216. Id. at 510.
217. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L.
REv. 593, 608 (1990) (criticizing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and noting
that "[i]t would be far more straightforward to ask whether the government has available
to it distinctive justifications because of the context in which the relevant burden is
imposed").
218. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). The Court wrote: "Where
certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and that legislative enactments
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." Id.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
219. See Sunstein, supra note 217, at 603.
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questions are reasonable. This objection implicates an essentially empirical
comparison of costs and benefits and hence cannot be resolved as a matter of
pure logic. As the Court noted in Vernonia, the "ultimate measure" of the
constitutionality of a search or seizure by public officials is its
"reasonableness."" 0 Moreover, the Court added, whether a particular search or
seizure qualifies as "reasonable" depends upon a comparison of the degree to
which it intrudes upon an interest protected by the Fourth Amendment with the
degree to which it promotes a legitimate governmental interest.22" ' Where the
government seeks to obtain evidence to support a criminal prosecution,
ordinarily a search or seizure will not be "reasonable" absent a warrant
supported by probable cause.2" In other contexts, however, a search or seizure
can satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment without resting upon
probable cause when, as the Court noted in Vernonia, "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable. '223 In Vernonia, the Court identified the public
schools as one context in which such "special needs" are present. In another
case, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn,224 the Court allowed the
Federal Railroad Administration to require workers potentially responsible for
serious accidents on the railways to submit samples of urine and blood to be
tested for the presence of illegal drugs and alcohol, even in the absence of
particularized suspicion or probable cause, given the high level of public
concern for the safe operation of trains. 25 The Court upheld a similar
requirement for employees of the United States Customs Service who seek a
transfer or promotion to a position directly involving the interdiction of illegal
drugs or requiring the carrying of a firearm in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab.26 In each of these cases, the Court engaged in an explicit
balancing test, comparing the imposition on privacy against the public interest
promoted. In Vernonia, the Court identified three factors in its analysis of the
school district's requirement that students participating in its athletics program
submit to random urinalysis drug testing. These were: (1) "the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the search ... intrudes"; 227 (2) "the character of the
intrusion ... complained of'; 228 and (3) "the nature and immediacy of the
220. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
221. Id. at 652-53 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 619 (1989)).
222. Id. at 653.
223. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (internal
quotation omitted).
224. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
225. Id. at 633-34.
226. 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989).
227. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).
228. Id. at 658.
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governmental concern at issue... and the efficacy of [the means chosen] for
meeting it.
' 229
Given the nature of the test for "reasonableness" under the Fourth
Amendment, it is impossible to state definitively that licensing authorities' non-
particularized intrusive questions about treatment for mental illness violate the
Constitution. But it is possible to adduce a few factors in support of such an
argument. First, the interest upon which licensing authorities' questions intrude,
although not one of physical integrity, is one of an intensely personal nature. As
the Supreme .Court noted recently in Jaffee v. Redmond,'20 effective
psychotherapy requires open, honest, and frank discussion of matters of deep
personal concern.3 Second, requiring applicants to release the records of
conversations with therapists opens every aspect of the therapeutic relationship
to potential review by a third party. Third, the government does not clearly
promote the integrity of the professions by requiring such releases in all
instances. In fact, asking applicants to answer intrusive questions and to execute
releases might dissuade some from seeking help and recovering their mental
health at all. Moreover, there is significant evidence that licensing authorities
rarely, if ever, use the information they obtain to deny a license.232
Consequently, the argument that licensing authorities should limit their
questions to serious mental illness in light of the Fourth Amendment is
persuasive. Finally, I do not argue that licensing authorities should never be able
to obtain precise information from third parties about the mental health of
applicants. I only advocate that we should require some form of particularized
suspicion. 3
In addition, review of the facts of Vernonia, Skinner, and Von Raab
indicates a basis for distinguishing these cases from the situation posed by
licensing authorities' questions. Use of the kinds of drugs at issue in these cases
(except alcohol, for which the railroads also tested in Skinner), is both elective
and illegal. Suffering from mental illness, if elective, is barely so, and certainly
is not illegal. Similarly, seeking professional help for mental illness is both legal
and desirable from a social standpoint, although elective. Second, as I have
attempted to argue throughout this Article, interference with the process of
therapy is likely to distort or destroy the process. By contrast, requiring athletes
and workers in sensitive or dangerous industries to submit urine samples,
229. Id. at 660.
230. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
231. Id. at 10.
232. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
233. One could also argue, in theory, that the Fourth Amendment applies only to
searches or seizures that facilitate official efforts to fight crime or quasi-criminal
activities. Certainly this is the Amendment's classic application. But the Supreme Court
has held that the Fourth Amendment protects people who are not suspected of criminal
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although invasive of bodily privacy, arguably does not impede physiological or
psychological function. The government's need for information to carry out its
legitimate business must give way at some point to the individual's strong
interest in privacy and personal growth. 4
VI. ALTERNATIVES To JUDICIAL REVIEW
The gravamen of the preceding three parts of this Article, discussing
substantive due process,235 free exercise,236 and the Fourth Amendment, 7 is that
the Constitution does not permit licensing authorities to require applicants to
answer intrusive questions about treatment for mental illness and to release
records relating to such treatment in all instances. As I have noted, however, the
current Supreme Court has been profoundly reluctant to expand the scope of the
Constitution in any material way, preferring instead to leave such decisions to
the elective branches. 23
8
So be it. There are legitimate concerns about the scope ofjudicial review
regardless of whether the Constitution supports thejudiciary's decisions. Judges
are not elected, nor (at the highest level) are their decisions subject to effective
short-term review. As a democracy, we should seek to minimize the instances
in which courts second-guess the decisions of elective departments of our
government" 9
Nevertheless, we are not a nation of parliamentary sovereignty. Our
Constitution does set forth many principles that protect individuals from official
overreaching, and we are generally committed to the concept of judicial review.
234. A fourth constitutional basis for limiting intrusive questions about treatment
for mental illness lies in the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
Although this provision does not offer explicit protection to conversations between
therapists and their patients, it does underscore the importance our Constitution places on
psychological protection of thoughts and expressive activity from unnecessary official
scrutiny. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). The Court wrote
in Miranda: "As a 'noble principle often transcends its origins,' the privilege has come
right-fully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a 'right to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of
democracy."' Id. (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 579, 581-82 (1956)
(Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
The Self-Incrimination Clause provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme
Court has held that this Clause applies to the states via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
235. See supra notes 123-61 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 162-97 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 198-234 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
239. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16, 18 (1962).
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We are thus committed both to the idea of majoritarian democracy and to the
concept of constitutional limitations on the power of the elective branches of
government.
As Professor Robert Burt argued in his monograph The Constitution in
Conflict,240 this does not put us in an impossible position. Judicial review, Burt
argues, addresses the contradiction inherent in the democratic principles of rule
by the majority and equal self-determination. 24 As Burt notes, if we allow
absolute rule by the majority, the majority can trample the rights of dissenters.
The alternative of vesting a veto in the minority, however, is equally
unappealing. According to Burt, judicial review is a "logical response to an
internal contradiction in democratic theory" rather than a "deviation" from that
theory.242 Nevertheless, it is strong medicine. Moreover, it is unnecessary
medicine when parties can settle their differences short of litigation.
Such an opportunity is present here. In light of the arguments I have made
in this Article, licensing authorities can choose to limit questions they ask and
records they require in accordance with their own duty to uphold the
Constitution. In doing so, they can take up the slack of protecting rights of
privacy that courts intelligently put aside. In fact, were legislators to undertake
this task, we would find ourselves in the best of all possible situations: we
would have decision-making by elected departments of the government and
continued fidelity to constitutional principles. Moreover, a pattern of legislative,
executive, and administrative recognition of such concerns could eventually
provide the foundation for judicial recognition of similar concerns. The
Supreme Court has often described substantive due process as an evolutionary
concept.243 Finally, if over time authorities proved incapable or unwilling to
recognize the need to keep conversations relating to mental illness fairly
confidential, courts then could step into the breach, as a last resort, using the
240. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992).
241. Id. at 29.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-50 (1992). As
Justice Harlan wrote in a separate opinion in Poe v. Ullman:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula .... The best that can be
said is that through the course of the Court's decisions it has represented the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of
the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society.... The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which
it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a
living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could
not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely
to be sound.
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constitutional provisions I have identified in this Article.2" But such a step
should be a last resort.
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts and administrators have limited intrusive questions asked by
licensing authorities about treatment for mental illness on the strength of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. This Act, although salutary in many respects,
reflects the medical model, which seeks to explain all illness, both physical and
mental, in strictly medical or scientific terms. This rationale puts people who
have obtained treatment for mental illness and who want to avoid answering
intrusive questions about their treatment in the awkward position of having to
assert a disability with a medical origin. In fact, however, their condition may
reflect the ordinary operation of their psyche. The history of religion suggests
that mental illness often is not purely pathological in the medical sense of the
word. The Constitution offers more solid protection for conversations between
therapists and patients. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to protect certain intimate
relationships. The Court has also suggested that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment protects what is functionally religious, as well as what is
literally so. The relationship between therapist and patient may facilitate or even
replicate precisely the process by which people grow religiously. Finally, the
Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures:
a request for information about treatment for mental illness, absent particularized
suspicion, arguably constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure.
244. See generally BURT, supra note 240, at 3 (describing the Supreme Court as an
equal, not superior, player in the development of constitutional law).
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